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THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE AND 
THE USE OF THE ARMED FORCES ABROAD 
John N. Moore 
The breadth of my assigned topic 
"The National Executive and Interna-
tional Law" suggests that my mission 
this morning is about like that of the 
fan dancer; to call attention to the 
suhject without really covering it. But 
rather than attempt a superficial survey 
of the range of problems in allocating 
the foreign affairs power hetween Con-
W"('SS, the President, and the Court, it 
may he mom rewarclin~ lo instead ('on-
('I'nlrale on the l'urrenlly mosl im-
porlant of lllOse prohlems. the power of 
lhe Pn'sidenl to usc the Armed Forccs 
ahroad. 
Ilislorirally, the controversy ovcr the 
war power and the controversy over lhe 
treaty power seem to have been the 
most imporlant constitulional issues in 
the scope of the Prcsident's fOf('ign 
affairs power. Of these, the trcaty 
power conlroversy has heen in alleast a 
state of temporary quiescence since the 
healed conlroversv in 19S4 over the 
Brir"l'r amellllml'l;l. With the defeal hy 
a lIarrow margill of lhl' Brieker allll'lIll-
1lI1'lIl, whil'h had 1.1'1'11 ailllt'd al n'-
~lrklinl! the I'n'sidl'lIl '8 powcr to makc 
illll'rnaliollal agn'emellls, this cOlllro-
versy was resolved ill favor of a COII-
tinnillg hroad view of I';xel'utive au-
thority. In (;ontrast, the dehate Oil 
Vielnam has heated white hol the eon-
troversy over lhc ex tent of Presidential 
power to use the Armed Forces ahroad, 
and has generated a concern with Presi-
dential power as insistent as any in our 
century. 1 
Basically the controversy eoneerns 
the authority of the President to order 
the Armed Forces into combat abroad 
and the question of when and how 
Congress must authorize the usc of the 
Armed Forces abroad. Although this 
problem is presented morc drama tically 
today than ever before, it is not new. 
i\luch of the current debate borrows 
argument from the clashes of .I efferson 
and lIamilton over the power of the 
President in the WOl naval war against 
the Bashaw of Tripoli and from the 
rhetoric of President Polk and Represen-
tative Abraham Lincoln in the IB46 
i\lexiean War. 
The starling point of the dehate is 
the Constitution, which gives Conf.,'Tess 
the power to declare war and to raisl~ 
and support Armies and which makl's 
the President the Conllnander in Chief 
and in practical effl'ct the chief repre-
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sentative of the nation in foreign affairs. 
IL seems reasonably clear from the 
debates at the Fedeml Constitutional 
Convention that most of the framers 
sought to place the major war power in 
Conl"rress and to leave the President only 
the right to repcl sudden allacks. The 
framers sought this restriction on Presi-
dential power because of their fear of 
concentrated power in the President. 
But the convention debates are not very 
useful in telling us who has power in 
situations which may be short of war or 
in resolving controversy about how Con-
gress might authorize the President to 
usc the Army and Navy. I\loreover, the 
Constitution is .1 living dOl'lllnent, and 
its nll'aning is shaped hy tl\(' c"pc'ric'III'e 
of slu'c'c'ssin' (:ongressc's ;lIId Presidents 
in filling: in its broad outlinl's 111111 in 
adapting it to changing cirelllllstances. 
As i\lr . .J ustice Frankfurter pointed out: 
"It is an inadmissihly narrow concep-
tion of American eOJJ::;titutional law to 
confine it to the words of the Constitu-
tioll and to disregard the gloss which life 
has written upon them.,,2 Nowhere is 
this statement or that of 1\1r . .Justice 
Holmes that "the life of the law has not 
been logic: it has been experienc(,,,3 
been more apt than in the interpretation 
of the war power. 
In the 180 years since the adoption 
of the Constitution, our nation has 
moved from a position of comparative 
isolation epitomized by Washington's 
warning to stay clear of entangling 
alliances to one of intense international 
involvement evidenced in 1968 by 
agreements for collcctive defense with 
42 countries. In the same period the 
international system has shifted from a 
balance of power system to a loose 
bipolar system marked by intense global 
competition among competing public 
order systems and a nuclear halance of 
terror. And international law has movcd 
frolll the notion of a just war to the 
prohihition of all for('(' as a nH'ans of 
lIlajor change under the lI.N. Charter. 
The increasing involvement of the 
United States in world affairs, the shift 
to an intensely competitive bipolar 
system, and the limitation of thc lawful 
use of force to defense have /:orreally 
strcngthened the hand of the Exccutive 
in the contest with Congress over the 
war power. Hamilton and .Jefferson 
fought over whelher, in the absence of 
congressional authorization to usc force, 
a Tripolitan cruiser must be released 
after capture by an American naval 
vessel. .Jefferson took the position that 
in the absence of congressional authori-
zation for U.S. Naval forces to go on the 
offensive, the cruiser must be released 
after being disabled from commiLLing 
furth('r hostilities. Bllt the eOlltempo· 
rary elc'hatc' is abollt Ihc' powc'r III 
cOllllllil from a '1"al'tc'l' 10 II half lIlillion 
troops in lIlajor wars slleh as Kon'a and 
Vietnalll. As the contmst in subjcets 
dc'baled shows. IIll'rl' ha~ IlI'l'n a I-rraelual 
ilJ('r<~a!'e in Pre~irlelltial power to lise the 
military ahroad over this period, an 
incrl'm~e whieh has ael'e1erated during 
the 20th century. 
Some comlllentators such as Profes-
sor Wormuth and Senator Fulhright tell 
us that the increase in Presid('ntial 
power vis·a·vis Conhrress has gOtH' too 
far. They painL a pil'lure of E:'\ccutivc 
usurpation of authority. But though 
they have a great deal to show us, the 
trouble is thaL the frame they use may 
he too small. We cannot just look to the 
language of the Constitution or th(, 
ex perienee of 150 years ago for the 
answer to prohlems and conditions not 
wholly antieipated. If we arc to display 
a proper instinct for the jU{rular instead 
of an instinct for the capillaries, we 
must apply the policy of the framers to 
the diverse pr~hlems and conditions of 
today. 
The policy of requiring congressional 
authority for the major usc of force 
abroad as a check on Presidential power 
remains as valid today, if not lIlore so, 
than in 1789. But prohlellls of colh'rtivc 
defense pursuant to treaty obligalions, 
the need for implementation of sane-
tions under article 42 of the United 
Nations Charter, an increasin!!:ly glohal 
dcfl'n~e inLl'rdcpClllhme!'. the wide rang(' 
of rt'~pon:;es to siLuaLion8 of intra~Late 
conflict, ami the swiftness of modern 
aLLal'k militate against ahsolu te answers 
based on that policy. 
The nature of our prohlem is 81lch 
that we arc unlikely to find many of 
what i\lr. Justice Frankfurter termed 
bright-linc distinctions. It will hclp im-
measurahly. however, if we first brieOy 
intlulge in the luxury of a minimum of 
clarification ahout the nature of the 
major questions we must deal with. 
Although there are really JIlany more, as 
a fir~L-slage complexiLy iL is (~onvcnil'nt 
to Lak(, four q u('sLions. Wilh t'aeh \\"t' 
an' l'llI\('('rt\('(1 wil hauL horizal ion to USt' 
tlw :\rt\wd Forces ahroad in confli(,t 
~iLuaLions. 
First, wh:11 \IIay I II!' Pr(~sitlt'nL do on 
hi~ own authority without congressional 
authorization? S('cond. if conwessional 
authorizalion is ne(~cssary, what form 
must it take? I\lust there be a formal 
tler.Jaration of war? Third, what terms 
of congressional authorization arc valid'? 
Can Conwess tldegalt! the authority to 
u:;e Lroops abro:ul to I he l'rcsi(h'nt, a1111, 
if so, how broad a delegaLion is permis-
~ihle? Lastly. to what ('xtent can the 
answers to the first three qucstions be 
rerolved by thc eourts? Are they "polili-
cal qnestions" or oLhl'rwise issues which 
it i8 ullwi8(' for a (~ourt to adjudicaLe'? 
Failure to separate these questions has 
carried more than its share of confusion. 
I will deal with these one at a time and 
then apply them all to the Vietnam 
situation. 
First, what may the President do on 
his OWII authority without congrcssional 
authorization? 
There is no douht that the President, 
acting on his own authority, may order 
the military to repel sudden attacks on 
the United States or American forces. 
Th(' draft proposals of the Constitution 
initially contailH'tl language :lUthorizing 
Conhrress to "make war," hut at the 
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instance of .Iamcs i\ladison the language 
was changed from "to make war" to "to 
tll'dare war." The n'ason given for till' 
changt~ was to leave to til(! l'n'sident 
"the power to repel sudden attack." 
Beyond that, there is greater contro-
versy. On the one hand, there arc those 
who take a broad view of Presidential 
power such as Craig I\Iathews who 
writes: 
Constitutional history has shown 
that the I'resid('nt can take military 
aetioll ulld!'r his indcpendrnt powrrs 
whenever the intl'rests of the Unitrd 
States so require. In the modern world 
the scope of America's interest can be 
determined only by reference to the 
slat!' of affairs in the intrrnational 
arena as a who\!' allll to Iht' OVt,r:tll 
purpOSt'" of our forl'il!1I polky. AllY 
ri~id tl'''1 of prolt't'labh' illlt'rt'si wouhl 
Irav!' the nalioll dangerously UII-
equipped for survivai.4 
Similarly, lInder Secretary Katzen-
bach, in testifyin~ reeently before the 
Scnate Forcign Relations Commillee, 
said that he doubts that any President 
has ever acted to the full limits of his 
Presidential authority.s There is sub-
stantial precedent in history for this 
broad interpretation of Presidential au-
thority. Former Assistant Seeretary of 
State .J ames Grafton Rogers tells us that 
in the over 100 uses of U.S. foree's 
abroad from 1789 to 1945 that the 
Executive ordered the use on his own 
authority in at least 80.6 And a 1951 
study for the COJllmittee on Foreign 
Relations says that: "Since the Consti-
tution was adopted there have heen at 
least 125 incidents in which the Presi-
dent, without congressional authoriza-
tion, .... has ordered the Armed Forces 
to take action or maintain positions 
abroad. ,,7 
Since these studies were completed 
we could add President Truman's use of 
a quarter of a million American troops 
in Korea, President Eisenhower's land-
ing of the marines in Lebanon, President 
Kennedy's limited usc of American 
forces in the Bay of Pigs invasion and as 
":uivis!'rs" in Vietnam, and Pn'sitlcnt 
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.I ohnson's landing 0 f lroops in the 
\)ominican Ih'puhlic. All of this cer-
tainly represl'nls a suhslantial I!lo~-; 
whieh e'(perience has placed on the 
Constitution. 
On the other hand, those who take a 
narrow view of Presidential power, such 
as Professor Ruhl Bartlell in testimony 
hefore the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee during the National Com-
mitment hearings, point out that most 
of these actions, with the greatest ex-
ception being Korea, did not involve 
sustained hostilities or more than minor 
casualties.8 Typically, they involved 
protection of U.S. citizens abroad, pur-
suit of pirates, alleged humanitarian 
intervention. n'prislls, or eonsl'nsu<ll 
assistance to a recognized government. 
And protracted and sustained use of 
troops abroad resulting in substantial 
casualties has IIsually been highly con-
troversial; the Korean war and President 
Polk's initiation of the Mexican War of 
lB46 being prime examples. 
Given this de{,tree of disagreement by 
sinccre and informed scholars, what 
guideposts arc there for delimiting Presi-
dential authority in those situations in 
which the President acts without con-
gressional authorization? Although they 
ean easily he overstated, there arc some 
policy considerations which, in my 
opinion. suggest a need for substantial 
Presidential authority. First, there is a 
need for the President to be able to 
4uickly react to sudden armed attacks 
threatening U.S. defense interests. The 
sudden aLLack in Korea and the rapid 
response of President Truman in initiat-
ing a process of troop eomlllitnwnt to 
Korea is, I helieve, a real example of this 
nced. Though suhject to abuse, possibly 
some actions to protect American citi-
zens ahroad fall in to all analagous cate-
gory. The joint United States-Belgian 
rescue operation in the Congo and the 
first stage of the Dominican operation 
are examples. There is also sometimes a 
lIeed for secrecy, deeisivencss, and nego-
tiating n:sponsivl'IIl'ss whieh ean hest be 
met hy Presidential a<:Lion. In this eall'-
gory I would citt, the adiolls of Presi-
dellt I\t'llnedy in the Cuhan missi!t: 
crisis. It seems to mc that the wisdom of 
congressional de hate ahout whether the 
response to the Soviet emplacement of 
n\t'dium-range ballistic missilcs in Cuha 
should be quarantine, air strikes 011 the 
missile sites, illvasion of Cuba, or no 
response at all, which is the dl'hatt~ 
which went on within the administra-
tion. is open to serious doubt. Robert 
Kennedy tells us in his account of the 
missile crisis that he doubts as satis-
factory an outcome could have bcen 
achieved if the oebatc over alternativcs 
had takl'n plan' in the full glan' of 
puhlil'ity. Alit! letot we l>uct'umh to tlw 
myth that the Pre8ident is always hawk-
ish and Congress is always dovish, we 
should remember Kennedy's account of 
thl' hawkish pressures from II'adillg (:011-
grc:ssman during the Illissil(' erisis. 
There is also a catq~ory of what 
might' be called "ongoing comma lit! 
deeisions," whieh are day-to-day tll'ci-
sions about the operation of existing 
llIilit.1ry assistanec programs within the 
network of U.S. t!efl'nse inlert'tots or 
about defcnsive deployment of our 
Armed Forces. By thl~ir rl'eurn'lIl na-
ture. mau)' of these dedsions inevitably 
will he left, in the first instance at least, 
to Presidential authority. Examples 
would he the et)n!lut'l or ('stabli~11t'11 
military advisory nllSslOns, military 
assistanec prOhtralllS, and intellig(~I\t'e 
missions necessary for national seeurity. 
i\loreovt'r, I helit've that some of the 
arguments for strictly limiting Prcsi-
dential authority misconceive the nature 
of Presidential power and elevate form 
over suhstanct'. Presidential power. even 
in the exercise of the Commander in 
Chief power, is not autonomous ano, as 
Richard Neustadt compellingly argues, 
is in large measure the power to p('r-
suade.9 It is difficult for a Presitlt'nt to 
pur::1ue sustained military al'lions with-
out the active support of a touhslantial 
scgmt~nt of Conhtrt's::1 and the Anlt'ril'llll 
people. And although Congress would 
lIsually be reluctant to do so, if things 
f!;ot too had Congress could refuse to 
appropriate funds or could even insti-
tute impeachment proceedings against 
the President. And short of these mea-
sures, the Congress can bring {.,'Teat 
pressure to bear on the President 
through the power of critical public 
hearings, as the Fulbright hearings on 
Vietnam perhaps more than adequately 
demonstrate. 
Dl'spite these reasons for some Presi-
dential authority in the use of troops 
abroad, it neither seems wise nor neces-
sary to cncoura~l' too great an ex pan-
~iun of Pn'sidl'ntial !H)WI'r. Within the 
limits of sun'ival in till' worltl WI' livl' in, 
WI' shonltl rl'ljuirl' thl' more broadly 
hased authorization whieh only Con-
gress can give and should strive to 
I 
n·vitalilll~ till: rolc~ of Congress in the 
making of foreign polil~y. 
As a dividing line for Presidcntial 
authority in the USI: of the military 
abroad, one test might be to require 
congressional authorization in all cases 
where regular combat units arc COIll-
miLLed to sustained hostilities. This test 
would be likely to indude most situa-
tiolls resulting in suhstantial casualties 
mill substantial cOlllmitmcnt of re-
sourccs. Undcr this tcst, the l"lexican 
War, the Korean war, and thl: Vietnam 
war would all require conl-'Tessional 
authorization. The tcst has the virtue of 
responsivencss to pmcisely those situa-
tions historically creating the greatest 
concern over Presidential authority, hut 
like all tests is somewhat frayed at the 
edges. In conflicts which gradually es-
calate, the dividing line for requiring 
congressional authorization might be 
initial commitment to combat of regular 
U.S. combat units as such. As to the 
suddenness of Korea, and conflicts like 
Korea, I would argue that the President 
should have the authority to mect the 
aLlack us nccessury but should im-
nll'diatl'ly ~;(H:k eongn'ssional authorilla-
tion. In rl'lrospcct, thc dceisiun not to 
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obtain formal congressional authoriza-
tion in the Korean war, in which the 
United States sustaincd mort: than 
L40,OOO casualties, seems a poor prece-
denL. And in those situations in which 
Presidential authority is based on the 
need for secrecy or immediacy of re-
sponse, the need should be a real one. 
To say that the President should have 
authority to act in some circumstances 
without congressional authorization is 
not to advise that he should not consult 
Congress or key congressional leaders. 
The President should involve Congress 
as much as practicable in every case. In 
fact, failure to pursue congressional 
invulVl'ml'nt meaningfully whl'n it ("uult! 
hU\"I' h"l'n I I III II' ha~ IIl','n till' I·aus,' 0 r II 
gn'at Ilt'al of Imneees~ary l'n'sidential 
grid. As Under Seeretary Katzen bach 
points out "there cun be no question 
thut ... I th(" President J acts most crfec-
tiVl'ly when Iw acts with the support 
and authority of the Congress."l 0 
Thc second question is: When con-
gressional authorization is necessary, 
what form should it take? Is a formal 
declaration of war required? 
l\'1ueh of the popular discussion 
ahou t the war power seenlS to assume 
that a formal dcdaration of war is the 
only means of constitu tionally ohtain-
ing congrcssional authorillation for the 
use of the military. But this one is 
largely a red herring. As a matter of 
logic, the syntax of the Constitution 
that "Congrcss should have power 
... to declare war" does not mean that 
Congress may not authorize hostilities 
without a formal declaration of war. 
And as a matter of intent of the 
framcrs, the requiremcnt is congres-
sional controi of hostilities, not a par-
ticular mode of authorization. This was 
so clear that within ] 2 years of the 
adoption of the Constitution no less an 
authorit y than r.hief .I ustice John i\ lar-
l'hall recognized in th(~ l·"l'C of Talbot I'. 
SCC'lIIa1l 11 that congn':lsional .. ction not 
amounting to u formal dedaration of 
war could he a vulid congressional au-
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thorization of hostilities. The ease arose 
out of the 1789 naval war with France, 
the first war of a fledgling United 
States. As a result of French raiding of 
American shipping, Con/,rrcss had passed 
a series of acts sllslH'ndillg commercial 
rclations with France, denouncing the 
treaties with France, and estahlishing a 
Department of the Navy and a I\larine 
Corps. The Court treated these acts as 
congressional authorization for limited 
hostilities with France. Practice since 
then shows that Conl,rress has declared 
war only five times, despite the milch 
larger number of oeca~ions on \Vhil'h the 
linited State~ hi\:'; becn at war. Then' i~ 
lillie rea~on, then. to helit'vt· that a 
formal declaration of war is tht, only 
means of congrcssional authorization of 
hostilities. A joint congressional resolu-
tion, which II\USt be approved by both 
houses of Congress, authorizing the 
President to usc the military ahroad is 
certainly as Under Secretary Katzen-
bach puts it "a functional equivalent of 
the declaration of war." 
There arc also numerous policy argu-
mcnt~ why the formal dedaration of 
war is undesirable under present circum-
stances. Argumcnts made include in-
erem;ed danger of misunderstanding of 
limited objectives, diplomatic cmhar-
ras:mlCnt in recognition of n()nrt~eog­
nized guerrilla opponcnts, inhihition of 
settlement possihilities, the danger of 
widening thc war, and unnecessarily 
increasing a President's domestic au-
thority. Although each of these argu-
ments has some merit, probably the 
most compelling reason for not using 
the formal declaration of war is that 
there is no reason to do so. As former 
Secretary of Defense l\leNarnara has 
pointed out "IT I here has not been a 
formal declaration of war--anywhere in 
the world-·since World War II. ,,12 
I\lore serious questions as to form of 
t'onp:t'r:>:>ional all thorizat ion int'I lid t' to 
what exll'nt can [on/-.rr(':>8 authorize the 
I'n':;itient to engagt' in ho~tilities by 
prior approval of an international agree-
ment'? And ·to what extent can con/,rres-
sional acquiescence in appropriation 
measures constitute congressional au-
thorization to cngllge in hostilities'? One 
ohvious prohlem with treaty authoriza-
tion is that 1Iithough the 1I01lse of 
Representatives would participate in a 
declaration of war, it would not partici-
pate in trcatymaking. This objection 
would be alleviated if the international 
agreement took the form of a eongres-
sionlll·exeeu tive agrcemcn t :<anetioned 
by a joint resolu tion. Prohlt'nlS in reeo/!:-
nizing appropriation nll'aSUrt'S as au-
thorization include et>nfronting COII-
grt·:;:; wilh a fait accompli antillSt't'rtain· 
illg lltc' :<t'OII(' of t~ollgrt's..;ionlll inlt'nl in 
a volt- t() lIpprove an approprilltion 
mcasure. 
The third question is: What terms of 
congressional authorization arc vlllid'? 
Can Congress delegate the authority to 
use troops abroad to thc President, alHl 
if so, how broad a delegation is permis-
sible? 
The permissihility of eongressionlll 
delegation of the war power to the 
President and exactly what constitutes a 
delegation have heen disputed through-
out U.S. history. In IB:J4 President 
Jackson sought congressional authoriza-
tion to undertake reprisals upon French 
property unless France paid her out-
standing debts for damages to Ameriean 
shipping during the Napolconie wars. 
There were objections in Congress on 
the grounds that it would amount to an 
unconstitutional transfer of Congress' 
war power to th(' Presidt'nt, llntl,lat'k:<on 
did not get his resolu tion, Similarly, in 
18;'7 President B.uchanan sought eon-
gressional auth~)rization to usc the mili-
tary at his discretion, if necessary to 
preserve freedom of communication 
across the Isthmus of Panama. Despite 
three requests, Congress refused to grant 
Buchanan the authority he requested. A 
principal argument against granting his 
request was that to do so would hc a 
surrender to the Presitlent of Congre~s' 
war power. The ohjection was a!!ain 
raised by Senators opposed to President 
Wilson's request for conl.,rressional au-
thority to tak(' (\t'f('m;ive nlea:;II\'c':; in 
proteetion of AIIH'riean shipping. Cor-
win tells us that Wilson wcnt ah('acl and 
armed American merchant vessels de-
spite congressional inaelion. 
More rccent experience has seen Con-
gress take a broader view on the delega-
tion issue. In the 19,15 United Nations 
Participation Act, Congress provided for 
delegation of authority to the President 
to engage in hostilities if acting pursuant 
to an article 4:~ U.N. collective peace 
force agreement approved by Congress. 
Apparently, however. no such at--rrc('-
ml'nt has yl't h('l'n approwc\ by <:on-
/!Tl'~. And in thl' 19:>5 ForllloslI \{l'l'lllu-
tion, the 19:)7 i\\i,I,l\e East Hesolution, 
alII I the 19(),l Tonkin (;ulf Hesolution, 
Conl.,rress au tho ri;r. cd the President to usc 
force to assist certllin arcas if subjected 
to arllled lIltack. In the case of the 
Forlllo:;a R(':;ollltion, [he 1\1iddle East 
I{esolution, and the Tonkin Gulf Heso-
lution, all were passed over the objec-
tion of at least one c.ongressman, Sena-
tor Wayne Morse, that the resolution 
amounted to an "unconstitutional pre-
dedaration of war." In none of these 
situations docs the delegation issue seem 
to have been considered very ade-
quatcly, and the practice is prohably 
inconclusivc. 
Pro fe:;sor Wormuth, arguing largely 
on thc basis of now defunct precedents 
of domestic delegation law, urges a 
strict antidclegation rule} 3 But the 
do III !':; I i(' d('\t'gllLion 1II1:11ogy ('one!'r1H'd 
with the limiLs 0 f conhrrcsl:iional delega-
tion of legislative power is not only 
(Iuel:itionahle today, but is also of only 
limited usefulness in the war power 
contcxt. The President has in his own 
right hoth suhstantial Ullthority to usc 
the military ahroml m\(1 authority as 
Commander in Chief, neither of which 
lire pres(~nt in comparahle degree in the 
donwstie delegaLion ca:;('s. 
And in vi(~w or the I,rreaL p()\\'('r or 
the I'resid('nt to purslll' a diplomatic 
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course leaving Congress little choice but 
war, and his grl'aL diserl'lion as COIll-
llIal\l\t'r in (:hic'f afkr formal I'Ongn'lI' 
sional auLhori;-;alion is given, il ~"('IIlS 
sOIlwwhat 'Iuixolic Lo lake a rigid 1II11i-
dc:l"l!;a till n stalH~e. Mon~ov(~r, tlwre are 
suhstantial prohlems in any antidclega-
tion stance as to when Congress is 
granting authorization with full knowl-
edgc of the eircumsLanees. And what is 
the standard for too broad a delegation? 
Certainly the test would he unrealistic if 
simply one of whcthcr discretion is left 
to the President, as the President proh-
ably always has the right as Commander 
in Chief to refuse to order American 
trooP$ into comhal. And IIl1le::s Con-
~ress speak:: Lo I he it'sue, he certainly 
has very crucial discretion as to theater 
of operaLions, weapons systems em-
ployed, and settlement terms, any of 
which can he as deeisive for conflict 
limitation as the original decision to lise 
force. 
It is hard to get away from the fact 
that the war power is in reality a joint 
executive-congressional power and that 
the President is always going to have a 
substantial discretionary role. The dele-
gation problem is more likely to be 
resolved by a pattern of practice re-
sponding to fclt needs than by overly 
neat a priori eonstitu tional hypotlH't'l!s. 
If there is to he a delegation tr~t, I 
would suggest that it be one asking 
whether there has bcen meaningful par-
ticipation by a Congress reasonahly in-
formed of the circumstances giving rise 
to the need for the use or U.S. forces. 
The fourth question is: To wltat 
extent can the answers to the first three 
questions he resolved hy the courts'? Arc 
they "politieai questions" or otherwise 
issues which it is unwise for a COllrt to 
adjlldieate'? 
The tradition of judicial review runs 
deep in the American system. But it is 
not l'very question Lhat is suiLahle for 
judieial rcview, Considc'ralions or lack 
of manageable sLandanl:; and inl('r-
f('rence with another coordinnte brandt 
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of Government are reasons which the 
Suprcme Court has given for dedining 
to decide a question. Thl'se considl'ra-
tions frcquently arisc in the separation-
of-powers context amI are all present to 
some dcgree in judicial determination of 
the scope of Presidential authority to 
use the Armed Forces abroad. For 
example, what could a court do which 
would not have a major adverse impact 
on the course of a war if it wanted to 
declare the war unconstitutional? This 
dilemma has led one ingenious advocate 
to argue that the Court should give a 
declaratory judgment in sudl circum-
stances. According to him, "a dl'e1ara-
tory judgmcnt would giw lillie comfort 
to the othcr side in the negotiations 
since the Executive can always go to the 
Congress for a declaration of war if the 
negotiations broak down."14 
If that is thc case, one wonders why 
the nccd for a declaratory judgment. 
And in any event, the suggestion shows 
a most unprofessional naivete in under-
stating the possible impact of such a 
ruling. 
For these and other reasons, a U.S. 
District Court in Kansas last .J uly dis-
missed a class action institutcd against 
the Prcsident, the Sccretary of State, 
and the Secretary of Defense seeking a 
declaratory judgnwnt that they had 
aded uneonstitutionally in the Vi(~tlla­
mesc war. 1 5 Though Lhe scopc of the 
Prcsident's authority to use the Armed 
Forces abroad is a constitutional ques-
tion, it is a question in separation of 
powers with few manageable standards, 
often running great risk of serious inter-
ference with legitimate defense require-
ments, and which is probahly suhject to 
more lasting solution from the con-
tinuing interplay bctween the chccks 
and powers of COIII,ITCSS and thc Presi-
dcnt. Though I helicve that a decision 
on the mcrits would uphold thc consti-
tutionality of thl' exl'cuti\'c-con~lTl's­
sional al'tion ill the Vidnam war, till' 
rI'fusal to mljudieatc t he issue it' Cl'r-
tainly the wisest course durillg the 
continuation of the conflict. There are, 
after all, other c1wcks in our syHtmn 
than judicial review, the chid HIIIOllg 
them being the election of a Presidellt. 
Let me hriefly apply these tests to 
the constitutional issues in the Vietnam 
confliet. First, the present magnitude of 
the Vietnam war in terms of troop 
levels, casualties, and impact on the 
natioll strongly militates for requiring 
congressional authorization. I would say 
that the point at which congressional 
authori1.ation should he required in 
Vietnam was the initiation in Fehruary 
I ')(1;' of the regular inLerdietive air 
allacks against the North mill the first 
t'u,;tain(·d lIS(~ of rI'gular U.S. eOlllhuL 
units in the sUlllmer allli fall of E)();'. 
And though I believe that at the 
current level of hostilitics congressional 
authorization should be required, given 
the Korean experience and the hreadth 
of Executive authority aeqllieseed in by 
both COlIgn'ss and the President for the 
last ;'0 ycars, argument to the contrary 
can certainly be in ~oOlI faith. 
Second, congressional authorization 
need not and should not take the form 
of a formal declaration of war. A joint 
resolution authorizing the use of COIll-
hat forces in hostilitiet' ill Vietnam, such 
as the Tonkin (;ull" Besolution of Au-
gust ] 96-1., is preferable and adequate. 
Preferable since there is no good reason 
to declare war, since a formal declara-
tion of war might connote an objective 
of subjugating North Vietnam and thus 
widening the war, and since avoidance 
of NLF recognition at too carly a stage 
in the negotiating process or prior to 
reciprocal concessions may be an impor-
tant diplomatic' goal. And adequate 
since Congress authorized President 
Johnson to usc the Armed Forces "to 
assist any mcmher or protocol stute of 
SEATO requesting assistance in de-
fense," and the President's use of U.S. 
forces in Vietnalll pursuant to this 
resolution is constitutionally authori1.(·d 
executi\'e-eon~rressional action. Sonll' 
argue that Congress wus 1I0t awure of 
thc magnitude of the war which it was 
authorizing, that the Tonkin Gulf Iteso-
lution WlIS hurric(1 through ClIngr!!:;,.'; 
with a sensc of urgency pret:luding 
adl~quate consideration, thal Congress 
was poorly i1lformed as to the cxtent or' 
attacks on American ships, and that 
thcrefore the resolution cannot be taken 
as sufficient con~essional authoriza-
tion. But the language of the resolution 
is certainly broad enough to include the 
pre:;ent hostiIi tics. It is that "Congrcss 
approvcs amI supports thc determina-
tion of thc President, us Commander in 
Chief, to take all neeessary measures to 
r('pcl any urmt'd a llack u~uinst thc 
f(ln'l'~ (If tIll' lInilt'd Slall'S ill II I to 
pn'\'('nt furllll'r ag;"'TI':'silln," ,\1111 I 111'-
Iil'\'" thal u fair n'ading (If lh,' eon~l's­
sional IIl'halt'::: in their ,'nlird), :::hows 
that alLhougllltlwn' was confusion mill 
disagreemcnt ahout the scope of the 
authorizution, the Congress and the 
Senute floor lead,'r of the resolution, 
Senutor Fulbright, were awure thut Con-
gress was giving the Prcsident the au-
thority, within his discretion, to take 
whatever action hc dcemed necessary 
with respect to the defense of South 
Vietnam. In fact, that is the wording of 
an cxchange on the floor of the Senate 
between Senators Fulbright and Cooper. 
TIll' same exchunge indicatcd 1111 undl'r-
sL1nding that the resolution was in-
tcnded to ratify the constitutional pro-
cess requirement of article IV of the 
SEATO Treaty.16 
AI though consideration of the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution was hasty, 
President Johnson clearly went to 
Congress because of his awareness of 
doubts raised during the Korean war 
as a result of President Truman's 
failure to request formal congressional 
authorization. The attacks on Ameri-
can ships in the Gulf of Tonkin were 
the opportunity but not the object of 
the resolution. 
Th" Tonkin (~ulf itl't'olution hus also 
h"I'n altill'kl'd a::: an invalid dc'I,'~atiou of 
the ,'oll~es:;ionul Wllr power. Butl'veu if 
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there is u constitutional requircment as 
to thc breadth of congressional delega-
tion of the wlir power to the Prt~sident, 
a proposition opl'n to c()nsidl'ruhlc~ 
doubt, the Conbrress which passed the 
Tonkin C;ulf Resolution W1IS, I helieve, 
reasonahly informed of the circum-
stances giving rise to the need for the 
use of U.S. forces. It wus aware that 
thcre was an ongoing guerrilla war in 
Vietnam which had he en escalating 
since 1959, that the United States had 
had over 12,000 advisory troops there 
since 1962, a figure dramatically on the 
increase since then, and that recently 
the President had ordered retaliatory air 
strikes on facilities in the North. As 
such, Congress was validly exercising its 
war power no matter how desirahle or 
iIIuminating additional debatc might 
have bcen. 
Although there are, as indicated, 
difficulties in reading too much into 
appropriation measures or other indicia 
of congressional authorization, the sub-
sequent refusal to repeal the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution and passage of military 
appropriation measures also lend some 
congressional authority to President 
.T ohnson 's actions. This is particularly 
true of the $700 million special Viet-
nam appropriation measure of i\lay 
1965. This measurc, rcqul't'ted shortly 
after President.l ohn:;on ':; major step-up 
of the U.S. response, was billed as 1111 
opporLunity for e:\pression of congres-
~ionul opinion on the huildup. 
I ,astly, although there are those who 
argue for judicial review of the constitu-
tionaliLy of the authorization of the use 
of American forccs in Vietnam, the lack 
of standurtis, the availahility of other 
checks in the system, and the possibly 
grave impact on the course of negotia-
tions strongly suggest the lack of wis-
,10m of judicial revicw of slIeh questions 
wh ilc the war continucs. Without pass-
ing judgmenL on all future questions 
which may arise, Lhc constitutional 
questions involved in the usc of the 
Armed Forces in Vietnam should best 
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hc left to rcsolution betwecn Congrcss 
and the President amI almost ccrtainly 
will he. 
If in grappling with these questions 
there is a complexity that tends to 
ovenvhelm, or if we vacillate from 
time to time in our thinking as to 
precisely where the line should be 
drawn, we can take comfort in 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s point that 
sometimes the genuine intellectual 
difficulty of a question makes a de-
gree of vacillation and mind changing 
eminently reasonable. 
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